Financial intermediaries worldwide are seeking mechanisms for participating in micro lending.
Introduction
Microfinance, and in particular microcredit which provides small loans, is gaining recognition because of its promise of giving access to finance to millions of world's poor and helping them rise out of poverty. Indeed, the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize awarded to Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank is a testimony of this growing promise of Microfinance. The role of moneylenders, who are alleged to charge usurious rates of interest, continues to be critical in the provision of microcredit in many developing countries (Akerlof, 1970 , Siamwalla et al, 1990 . By contrast, formal financial intermediaries, such as banks, not only suffer from an informational disadvantage and an inability to enforce contracts, prohibitively high transactions costs of lending small amounts make it all but impossible to extend credit profitably. The mechanism for the provision of microfinance continues to be a challenge. Our paper offers an alternative institutional structure as a possible solution for the unique demands of microfinance.
We explore an alternative mode of credit provision based on the use of information available within the local population and consider the role of these locally-informed individuals as effective on-lenders for mainstream financial institutions. We argue that, unlike banks, there exist many individuals in the neighborhood of any given borrower who possess relevant information about the borrower that is helpful in screening and monitoring the borrower. Besides information, some of these individuals may also possess (possibly illiquid) collateral, such as houses, jewelry and animals, against which they could obtain loans from various formal financial intermediaries, such as banks, for on-lending to borrowers without such collateral but in need of funds. But these potential lenders, let us call them "local capitalists," may lack the necessary enforcement technology that is available to the moneylender. They would have to rely on self-enforcing contracts to prevent the borrower from defaulting voluntarily. Even when each local capitalist can credibly threaten to deny further credit to a borrower who defaults on a loan made by him (i.e., bilateral punishment strategy, along the lines of Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994) , it is ineffective in deterring voluntary default in the face of competition among such local capitalists. Following default against one local capitalist, the borrower may approach another local capitalist for a loan subsequently. The possibility of voluntary default by a borrower in the presence of multiple local capitalists without an effective enforcement technology reduces and may eliminate each local capitalist's incentive to offer a loan in the first place.
We consider a coalition in which each local capitalist commits to refuse credit to a borrower who may have defaulted against another member of the coalition (i.e., multilateral punishment strategy). If such an arrangement can attract local capitalists as lenders, it would reduce the borrower's incentive for voluntary default. The incentive for a local capitalist to join the coalition would be the possibility of making a loan profitably where no such market is feasible in the absence of such a coalition. However, each local capitalist would continue to compete against other coalition members for the borrower's business prior to a default.
The suggested multilateral punishment strategy resolves the local capitalists' commitment and contract enforcement problem. It is worth noting that the primary purpose of the coalition envisaged here is not necessarily as an institution, such as a credit bureau, for sharing borrower default information. In fact, even if such information were publicly available, lending, in our model, would not take place in the absence of a coalition. Coalition, in our model, is an multilateral punishment strategy by which lenders credibly commit not to lend to a defaulter even when it may be individually desirable to do so ex post.
However, the feasibility of local capitalist lending becomes suspect once we allow for competition between an independent moneylender and local capitalists who lend as a coalition. We show that when the moneylender is the cheapest producer of loans, the local capitalists, even if they form a coalition, cannot out-compete the moneylender who possesses superior enforcement technology.
The moneylender repeatedly provides loans to the borrower effectively shutting the local capitalists out of the market for microcredit. We argue that Franchising could provide both a mechanism for all local capitalists to form a coalition as well as allow them to reduce costs of making loans and thus be able to effectively compete with the moneylender.
We discuss the possibility of competition among formal financial institutions in offering franchises. In the extreme case with unfettered competition between banks to offer franchises, strategic default again becomes feasible and the market for credit through franchising fails, leaving only the usurious moneylender. This suggests that there may be no reason to encourage competition between banks in offering franchises. In fact, some monopoly power -exclusive territorial rights, for instance -for each bank may be a desirable policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and the local capitalists' commitment problem. Section 3 discusses a mechanism to address the commitment problem in the presence of moneylenders. Section 4 provides various extensions to the model. In Section 5, we point to some existing literature that is related to our paper. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Model
We assume a local area, e.g., a small village economy, with three sets of players -borrowers, moneylenders with enforcement technologies, and local capitalists with (possibly illiquid) collateral against which they can borrow funds from financial intermediaries to potentially lend to borrowers with no collateral. All players are risk neutral.
In every period, a borrower without any collateral and without any funds of her own, needs $1 to fund a project. In the next period, the project generates a gross payoff, R, with probability p, and 0 otherwise. The project is a positive NPV project, pR 1+r f > 1 where all risk-neutral agents discount future cash flows at the risk-free rate r f . Let r d denote the discount rate adjusted for the condition that the positive payoff R is obtained only with probability p < 1. Thus
The only contract that moneylenders can offer is a standard loan contract. For each borrower, there is a single moneylender in the village who has the ability to enforce the loan contract. 1 We define enforcement as the ability of the moneylender to impose a cost on the borrower, explicit or implicit, either through social sanctions or physical sanctions, equal or greater than what is owed to him by the borrower. This ensures that the borrower obtains no benefit from voluntarily defaulting against the moneylender.
There are a number of local capitalists in the local area who own assets that they can pledge as collateral to borrow from banks at the risk-free rate. However, they do not have an enforcement technology of the type that is available to the moneylender. We assume that the borrower can consume the funds after voluntarily defaulting on her loans from local capitalists, but local capitalists can prevent the borrower from defaulting and investing these funds in future projects (in essence becoming her own banker for future projects). 2 Each lender incurs a unique cost of screening and monitoring the loan (let us call it transaction cost of lending) to a given borrower every time he enters into a loan contract with the borrower.
Lenders incur a cost of monitoring to ensure that the funds are being used for the declared purpose.
Lenders are differentially familiar with a borrower. The more familiar is the lender, the lower is his transaction cost. One way to think about this is that the transaction cost is based on the distance between the lender and the borrower. So, the closer the borrower, the lower the transaction cost.
Note that these costs are specific to the borrower. In other words, a lender will have different transaction costs for different borrowers. Without any loss of generality let us denote these costs for other local capitalists as
We assume that for each borrower, there is a moneylender who incurs transaction cost of c M . For simplicity, we do not carry any notation denoting the borrower.
We assume that project return, success probability, discount rates and lenders' transaction costs are all common knowledge. We also assume that a borrower cannot have multiple loans at any point in time. So, borrowing may take place sequentially without concerns about debt priority.
In case the project fails, the borrower would be forced to default. However, a borrower can also default voluntarily when the project is successful. We assume that local capitalists cannot identify the reason for defaulting. Each local capitalist chooses never to re-lend to a borrower who has defaulted on his loan to him. This can be supported by a reputation argument in which a local capitalist deviating from this policy might be flooded with defaults by his other borrowers.
In every period, there are two stages. In stage one, a lender decides whether to lend to a specific borrower or not, and what interest rate (r) to charge. Then the borrower decides whether to undertake the project. If she decides to undertake the project, she chooses the lender to borrow from. In stage two, payoffs are realized and a borrower decides whether or not to default on the loan. The same game can be repeated over multiple periods for every borrower.
Borrower's participation constraint is simply that the total amount owed, the principal payment of 1 plus the interest payment of r amount owed cannot exceed the gross payoff from the project.
Formally,
Lenders' participation constraints are that they must expect to recover the amount owed plus the transaction cost of making the loan, c. Let r 0 (c) denote the minimum interest that a lender must charge to break-even (make zero expected profits). Thus 1 + r 0 (c) represents the total cost of making a $1 loan to the borrower. For a lender with transaction cost c,
It is easy to see that
Lenders' participation constraints, then, are that the interest charged must be such that it exceeds the cost of lending. Formally,
A Monopolist Moneylender
We assumed that for every borrower, there exists a moneylender with transaction cost c M and an enforcement technology that ensures that the borrower will choose not to default voluntarily.
Suppose moneylender is the only lender willing to make a loan to the given borrower. In this case, because he is a monopolist, he will extract all the surplus possible and charge an interest rate r M such that
This fits in well with the observation that borrowers in many cases face a monopolist moneylender who charges usurious rates on interest. So the borrower has a net payoff of 0. The entire surplus that the moneylender enjoys is due to his monopoly position since in a competitive market, he would have charged r 0 (c M ) and not suffered any voluntary default given his enforcement technology.
Competing Local Capitalists as Potential Lenders
Now consider the case where there exist many local capitalists who could potentially lend to the borrower. They rely on self-enforcing contracts to deter borrower default. In particular, we study each local capitalist's use of a bilateral punishment strategy whereby he does not lend to a borrower who defaults against him. We determine conditions under which such a mechanism would permit local capitalist lending.
Let V n denote the present value of borrower's surplus when there are n opportunities to borrow sequentially from local capitalists after each successive default. If the borrower does not default voluntarily, then with probability p, the project returns R, the borrower repays (1 + r n ) and she is in the same situation as before. With probability (1 − p), the project returns zero, the borrower is forced to default and she now has only n − 1 opportunities left for defaulting. Formally,
Solving, we get
where
The first term in the above expression represents the present value of the surplus R − (1 + r n )
in perpetuity discounted at r d , the risk-free rate adjusted for the probability of default by the borrower. The second term represents the borrower surplus when she has n − 1 opportunities for default discounted by θ which depends on the risk-free rate as well as the probability (1 − p) with which the borrower is likely to default on her first loan.
Clearly, V 0 = 0 since there are no further credit opportunities to borrow from local capitalists.
(Whether the moneylender is still available to borrow from after exhausting all possible opportunities to borrow from local capitalists does not affect V n since borrower's surplus is zero when the moneylender is the last possible source of loans.) With only 1 potential lender (i.e., n = 1), the borrower will choose not to default if what she owes to the lender (1 + r 1 ) is smaller than the value V 1 from not defaulting. Formally, this condition is expressed as
Simplifying, we get
This gives us our first proposition.
Proposition 1 If every local capitalist's cost of lending
, then the borrower will only be able to borrow from the monopolist moneylender who will extract all surplus.
Financial intermediaries such as banks may be characterized by high transaction costs of lending (partly caused by asymmetric information) and no technology to enforce loan contracts such that (7) is violated. These constraints on lending may explain why the intermediaries are unable to lend to borrowers in the absence of collateral without suffering losses caused by frequent defaults by borrowers. We assume that there exist many local capitalists who possess relevant local information about any given borrower such that their transaction cost c is small enough that condition (7) is satisfied. We will now show that the mere presence of many such local capitalists does not guarantee that they will be willing to lend to the borrower with no collateral.
We derive a condition for the borrower not defaulting voluntarily when she has two opportunities for defaulting before exhausting all sources of credit from local capitalists. Substituting n = 2 in (4), we get
which implies that
The term V 2 − V 1 represents the penalty of defaulting voluntarily when there are two opportunities to borrow from local capitalists because by defaulting voluntarily, the borrower forgoes one of the two opportunities. When n = 2, the borrower will choose not to default if
Again, combining this with lenders' participation constraint, we get
Proposition 2 Assume that there exist many local capitalists with costs of lending 1 + r 0 (c) such
Lending by local capitalists, even though individually feasible, will not occur in equilibrium when
there exists an even number of opportunities for default.
Proof : The condition on cost of lending satisfies (7) but violates (8) . So, lending would occur if the borrower has only one opportunity for default. Now, suppose there are only two local capitalists.
In this case, neither of the two has an incentive to lend first because he knows that the minimum interest rate that he must charge to recover his costs are so high, since (8) is violated, that the borrower has an incentive to default on the loan offered by the local capitalist and then subsequently borrow from the other local capitalist. Now suppose there were three local capitalists. Now, every local capitalist would like to lend first knowing that following a default the remaining two will not lend to the borrower again. So lending will be an equilibrium outcome when it is common knowledge that there are exactly three lenders. This implies, however, that with exactly four lenders, no lending will be an equilibrium outcome again. This creates a pattern in which lending occurs in equilibrium when there are odd number of lenders and no lending takes place when the number of lenders is even.
The above proposition shows that with exactly two local capitalists, no lending will take place.
Arguably, this could provide an incentive for the two local capitalists to form a coalition such that together they restrict the borrower from defaulting more than once. Now, with three local capitalists, lending may in fact no longer be an equilibrium. This is because no lender would risk lending to the borrower first fearing that the remaining two lenders might form a coalition and lend to the borrower after she has defaulted on the first lender. However, if all three lenders were to form a coalition and restrict the borrower from borrowing again after default, lending becomes feasible again. This suggests that the only way lending will occur with many local capitalists will be if all were to form a coalition based on a multilateral punishment strategy that restricts the members from lending to a borrower after a default.
A Solution with Local Capitalist Coalition
Formation of a coalition of local capitalists requires credible commitment among its members to ensure that the borrower would effectively obtain only one opportunity for defaulting against local capitalists as a group. Such a commitment may arise endogenously as in Greif (1993) . Of course, coalitions may also arise in the form of institutions that put in place explicit restrictions on participating coalition members who agree to abide by these restrictions because it is profitable to join the coalition (Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994) . 3 Consider a coalition of local capitalists (henceforth referred to as "coalition") in which no coalition member can offer a loan to a borrower who may have defaulted against any coalition lender. However, there is no restriction on the interest rate that any participating coalition member may charge.
It is obvious that each local capitalist would have an incentive to join the coalition, given that he does not make a loan in the absence of such a mechanism. Assume that the moneylender does not join the coalition. (We can later demonstrate that this is indeed the moneylender's optimal decision.) So, a default against the local capitalist coalition does not preclude the moneylender from extending another loan to the borrower, and vice versa. Effectively, there is only one possible opportunity to borrow from local capitalists.
Competition between the Coalition and a Non-forgiving Moneylender
It is useful to first consider the case in which the moneylender chooses to deny further credit to a borrower who defaults on the moneylender's loan. (We shall later see, that the moneylender will, in fact, continue lending to a defaulting borrower.) Thus the borrower has two chances to default before getting shut-off completely from the market for loans.
The borrower can approach the moneylender and the coalition in two possible sequences. One is to borrow from a local capitalist first and in the event of a non-voluntary default, go to the moneylender as the last resort. The second possible sequence is to borrow from the moneylender first and in the event of a non-voluntary default, go to a coalition member as the last resort.
We have seen earlier that if the moneylender is borrower's only lending source, he acts as a monopolist and charges her an interest rate r M 1 to extract all the surplus. Formally,
The subscript 1 on the interest rate indicates that the borrower has one chance to default before exhausting all borrowing opportunities. The superscript denotes the lender who is the moneylender M in this case.
On the other hand, if the borrower has already defaulted on the moneylender and coalition is the only sources left for borrowing, there will be Bertrand competition among the local capitalists and the local capitalist with the smallest transaction cost to the borrower, c 1 , will lend and charge an interest rate that prevents the local capitalist with the next smallest transaction cost, c 2 , from offering the loan and making a positive profit. Formally,
At this interest rate, local capitalist with the smallest transaction cost c 1 will expect to make a positive profit whereas all remaining local capitalists with transaction costs greater than or equal to c 2 will make non-positive profits.
Let X(r, c) denote the present value of the profits made by a lender charging an interest rate of r and transaction cost c. Then,
The term 1 + c represents the total upfront costs of making a loan of 1. With probability p, the borrower will repay (1+r) next period and the lender will be in identical situation. With probability (1 − p), there is default and hence no further lending occurs resulting in zero payoff. Solving for X(r, c), substituting from (1), (2) and simplifying, we get
The expression above has a simple intuitive interpretation. The lender collects (1 + r) every period whereas the cost of making the loan is [1+r 0 (c)]. This difference between the two is lender's surplus in perpetuity which is discounted at the default-risk adjusted rate r d . Thus, for the moneylender lending last, from (9)
and for the local capitalist with transaction cost c 1 lending last, from (10)
Let r M 2 denote the interest charged by the moneylender, if he decides to lend first and the borrower has two opportunities to default before exhausting all sources of credit. Then,
Similarly, let r 1 2 denote the interest charged by the local capitalists with the smallest cost, c 1 , if he decides to lend first and the borrower has two opportunities to default before exhausting all sources of credit. Then,
We now examine lenders' incentives to lend first rather than wait for the borrower to default and then lend. Let Y (r 1 , c) denote the present value of a lender's expected profits, if he waits for the borrower to default against the first lender, which happens with probability (1 − p). With probability p, the borrower repays the loan to the first lender in which case the lender who waits is in exactly the same situation. Then,
Solving for Y (r 1 , c), we get
The moneylender will choose to lend first rather than wait for the borrower to default and then lend if
The right hand side of the above condition is a weighted average of what the moneylender will collect if he waits to lend to the borrower after she has defaulted on the coalition lender, R, and the smallest rate the moneylender can charge without making losses, [1 + r 0 (c M )]. The weight given to R is θ.
Analogously, the local capitalist with transaction cost c 1 will choose to lend first rather than wait for the borrower to default and then lend if
Substituting from (12) and (14) and simplifying, we get
The right hand side of the above condition is a weighted average of the rate the local capitalist will charge when he competes with the local capitalist with the next smallest transaction cost, We now consider the borrower's decision. Let V
M,1 2
denote the present value of the borrower's surplus if she chooses to borrow from the moneylender first and then the local capitalist with transaction cost c 1 . The surplus after defaulting on the moneylender, denoted V 1 1 , is:
Thus,
Simplifying and substituting from (5), we get
Let V
1,M 2
denote the present value of the borrower's surplus if she chooses to borrow from the local capitalist with transaction cost c 1 first and then the moneylender. The surplus after defaulting on the local capitalist is zero as the moneylender extracts all the surplus from the borrower when he is the last lender. Thus, 
Similarly, borrower welfare at the smallest interest rate that the local capitalist with transaction cost c 1 would be willing to charge to lend first is:
Comparing (22) and (23) Proof: The moneylender chooses an interest rate just below the rate which makes the borrower welfare equal to the maximum she could obtain were she to borrow from the local capitalist first which is given by (23) . Using (19) in (20) and equating it to (23), we get:
Since c M < c 1 , the rate above satisfies the moneylender's incentive to lend first as given in (16) .
Comparing (24) with the local capitalist's best offer given by the RHS of (18), the result follows.
The result above is interesting -it shows that the borrower prefers to borrow from the moneylender first even though the interest rate charged by the moneylender is higher than what the coalition would charge to lend first. When the moneylender is competing for borrower's business with the coalition, he has an incentive to lower his interest rate. However, the moneylender does not have to lower the interest rate charged too much because the borrower realizes that were she to borrow from the coalition lender first, she would have no surplus left after she has defaulted on the coalition and the moneylender is the only game in town.
It is easy to see that the moneylender makes positive profits. When c M < c 1 , the coalition lends only after the borrower has defaulted against the moneylender who refuses to lend him again by assumption. The local capitalist with the smallest cost c 1 charges r 0 (c 2 ) and makes strictly positive profits in equilibrium, from (12) .
Note that if the moneylender too were to join the coalition, with Bertrand competition, the moneylender would charge r 0 (c 1 ) which is lower than the interest moneylender charges without being part of the coalition, given by (24). So, it is optimal for the moneylender to not join the coalition, which is consistent with assumption we made at the outset.
Competition between the Coalition and a Forgiving Moneylender
So far we had assumed that the moneylender refuses to lend to a borrower who defaults on a loan made by the moneylender. However, given that lending is profitable for the moneylender, there is no reason to assume that he would not want to lend again to a defaulting borrower. From the borrower's perspective, the fact that moneylender may be willing to lend again after a default does not alter her incentives to voluntarily default given moneylender's enforcement technology. This suggests that moneylender may in fact continue to offer loans to the borrower even after repeated defaults.
If the moneylender is able to offer an interest rate that leads the borrower to borrow from him first, the coalition will effectively never have an opportunity to lend. So, the coalition will be willing to lend first as long as it can offer an interest rate that covers its cost of making the loan, i.e., 1 + r
The maximum borrower surplus in this case is
Now consider the moneylender's incentives to lend first rather than wait until the borrower defaults on coalition loan. Let X ∞ (r M , c M ) denote the present value of the profits made by a lender charging an interest rate of r M and transaction cost c M . Then,
On the other hand, if the moneylender lends after the borrower has defaulted on coalition loan, the present value of his profits are:
From (26) and (27), it follows that the moneylender would prefer to lend before the coalition if:
The borrower surplus in this case is
The borrower would prefer to borrow from the moneylender if the moneylender charges r M such that (29) exceeds (25) which after simplifying implies:
Notice that if c 1 < c M , (30) and (28) cannot hold simultaneously. In this case, the borrower will borrow first from the coalition and go to the moneylender only after defaulting on the coalition loan. The moneylender, of course, extracts all surplus from the borrower indefinitely.
If, on the other hand, c M < c 1 setting (30) as an equality also satisfies (28) and thus it is feasible for the moneylender to offer an interest rate that forces the coalition to wait indefinitely. We thus get the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If c M < c 1 , the borrower repeatedly borrows only from the moneylender.
Franchising
The result in Proposition 5 is remarkable because it suggests that when the moneylender is the cheapest producer of loans, the local capitalists cannot out-compete the moneylender even if they form a coalition. So while the threat such a coalition might pose could be useful in inducing the moneylender to drop his interest rate, the fact that such a coalition would never have an opportunity to lend may hinder the emergence of such a coalition in the first place. This is a pessimistic result. One might therefore wonder if local capitalists' cost disadvantage vis-a-vis the moneylender could be eliminated either by direct subsidies or by instituting processes that make their operations sufficiently streamlined and efficient. We claim that the latter is precisely what could be accomplished by Franchising. Franchising could not only provide a commitment mechanism that prevents all franchisees from offering loans to borrowers who default on any franchisee, but at the same time may allow cost reductions facilitated by standardization, economies of scale and implementation of best practices. In fact, what we have shown is that neither the coalition formation nor cost-efficiencies by themselves are sufficient to make a dent in the moneylender's monopoly position.
Extending the Model

Introducing Borrower Moral Hazard in Project Choice
In the simple model that we analyzed, we assumed that the borrower's project choice was limited to one positive NPV project with probability of success p and payoff of R when the project is successful. In this framework, since incentive compatibility conditions ensure that borrower will choose not to default voluntarily, only involuntary default occurs with probability 1 − p and lenders choose contractual repayment rates accordingly. One could extend the model by allowing borrowers to choose from a continuum of projects with different levels of payoff R in successful states such that the probability of success is smaller for projects with larger R. To model borrowers' moral hazard in project choice, the NPV of the projects could be ranked such that riskier projects have smaller expected payoffs, pR, and consequently smaller, possibly negative, NPVs. If project choice is unobservable by lenders, the borrower now may have an incentive to shift to riskier projects after the lender sets the contractual rate. However, higher failure probability and the resulting inability to borrow again from the lender would serve to contain the borrower's incentives for choosing riskier projects. Qualitatively, this leads to same results as the ones we obtain from our simpler model.
Alternatively, we could further generalize the model to allow for some positive payoff -as opposed to zero in our simple model -in states in which the borrower is forced to default. Since the moneylender is assumed to have a stronger enforcement technology -the moneylender makes sure the borrower consumes nothing in states of default whereas local capitalists can only make sure that the borrower does not get to invest the proceeds in projects -the moral hazard problem is better contained by the moneylender than by local capitalists. Similarly, allowing the moneylender to better observe the borrower's project choice will give him additional competitive advantage. This will make the likelihood of the coalition providing a credible competitive threat to the moneylender even more remote suggesting that a cost-reduction function of franchising would be even more critical.
Introducing Borrowers with Different Risks
Our simple model assumed a single borrower type defined by the positive NPV project with probability of success p and project payoff of R when the project is successful. In this framework, since incentive compatibility conditions ensure that borrower will choose not to default voluntarily, the involuntary default, which happens with probability 1 − p conveys no information about the riskiness of the borrower which is common knowledge. In a more general model, one could model a continuum of borrower types defined by project success probability p -riskier borrower will have projects with smaller probability of success and smaller, possibly negative, NPV projects. When borrower type is unobservable (and ex ante signaling and selection possibilities are ruled out), a pooling equilibrium may initially be feasible. The incidence of (involuntary) default, however, will contain useful information about borrower type. If an incidence of (involuntary) default is sufficient to separate good borrower types (with positive NPV projects) from bad borrower types (with negative NPV projects), we may not need any institutional mechanism that allows local capitalists to collude in denying credit to a defaulter because a good borrower type will have no incentive to default voluntarily lest she may be pooled with bad borrower types after defaulting. If that
were the case, we should observe competitive financial intermediation by local capitalists already without any need for mechanisms such as the one we are suggesting in the paper. The fact that we do not see such competitive intermediation to a large extent, except for a limited presence of moneylenders who appear to be charging usurious rate, suggests that learning about borrower type and borrower reputation is not enough to sustain an equilibrium in which poor borrowers without collateral are able to borrow at competitive rates -the very basic premise for microfinance in the first place.
A richer model, in which both some collusion by lenders is necessary and learning about borrower types takes place, will complicate the analysis and is unlikely to affect the main results and insights that we obtain in our framework. This is not to deny that borrower default will provide useful information about borrower riskiness and indeed, institutional mechanisms that allow intermediaries such as credit bureaus to share this information will make financial intermediation more likely.
Multiple Franchisors
So far, we had assumed that there was only one possible franchisor that all local capitalists offered to join. We showed that the introduction of a franchise facilitates lending by local capitalists.
Successful franchising could attract other franchisors into this market. In the limit, if there are many franchisors available, this would be equivalent to the case without franchising, whence the market may once again fail unless mechanisms to limit borrowers' access to franchisors arise. Such mechanisms may arise naturally in a competitive market. For example, franchisors may develop syndicates the primary purpose of which would be to limit borrower access to credit after default (Chowdhry, 1991) . 
Related Literature
In this paper, we consider the problem of contract enfocement and commitment, along the lines of the work by Greif (1993) and Greif, Milgrom and Weingast(1994) , among others. As in their work, we also consider alternative punishment strategies and identify a mechanism for credible commitment on the part of the local capitalists. However, our analysis goes beyond their work by explicitly considering the role of competition among local capitalists as well as between local capitalists and a moneylender. Such interplay between different types of players is found to have important implications for the final outcome.
Besides these papers, our paper is broadly related to two other strands in the literature. sions. To begin with, our focus is primarily on strategic default, rathen than ex ante asymmetric information regarding borrower types. So, we are not concerned with the sorting problem. More importantly, we allow for a bank to link up simultaneously with many competing informal lenders rather than just one as in the Varghese study. We therefore allow for competition in conjunction with linkages, not just one or the other.
Concluding Remarks
With growing recognition of the economic importance of those at the bottom of the pyramid, formal financial institutions need to identify effective mechanisms for participation in that sector. In this paper, we allow for the co-existence of formal and informal lenders in addressing the problem of microfinance. Local individuals are repositories of information and could serve an important role as on-lenders in this financial intermediation process. We show that using these competing individuals for on-lending may be ineffective due to borrowers' incentive for strategic default when there exist many opportunities for borrowing. We offer franchising as one possible mechanism which would allow banks to simultaneously use local capitalists and address the market failure resulting from the risk of strategic default. It is equally important that franchising ensure that the local capitalist with the smallest transaction cost for a particular borrower is made sufficiently cost-effective to outcompete the moneylender and attract her business resulting in natural segmentation of borrowers based on smallest lending costs.
The different features of franchising that we have discussed are present in varying degrees across existing MFIs. For instance, BASIX in India appears to rely to a large extent on local information in its lending decisions. However, individuals who possess local information are not principals but agents of BASIX. In our framework, formal financial institutions found it profitable to lend funds to these individuals for two reasons. One, individuals with local information could provide collateral.
Two, because they made multiple loans, the size of the loans by the formal financial institutions to each local capitalist could be substantially larger resulting in reduced transactions costs. The cost-efficiency features of franchising in our framework may be present in the operations of many MFIs. For instance, ACCION International provides technical assistance to improve operations and efficiency. SKS Microfinance uses sophisticated management information systems, innovative delivery solutions, and technology such as Smartcards, which have increased operational efficiency and reduced transaction costs. Though the sole presence of a single MFI besides the moneylenders in a village may be similar to a franchise that we are proposing, it does not exploit competition between local capitalists that is central to our notion of franchising. We argue that franchising needs to incorporates all the elements -individuals with local information as principals who act as a single coalition and cost-efficiencies that are large enough to out-compete the low cost moneylender. 4 4 We are encouraged by our initial discussions with Greg Casagrande, who is the founder and chairman of South Pacific Business Development (SPBD) Foundation in Samoa, and Nigel Burr, who is a member of the Board of Directors for SPBD, on plans to implement the model on the island of Savaii in Samoa. Indeed, if the implementation shows promise, the "Savaii Model," which combines the insights and wisdom of Muhammad Yunus (Yunus, 2003) with those of Hernando de Soto (de Soto, 2003), could provide a sustainable and scalable alternative to existing micro-lending models in practice today in alleviating poverty using microfinance.
a franchising mechanism could attract multiple financial intermediaries. Competition between a large number of franchise-offering banks could once again lead to the failure of on-lending through local capitalists. Some endogenous competitive market mechanisms such as syndication and credit bureaus may arise that will limit possibilities of multiple defaults by borrowers. However, if market mechanisms remain insufficient to sustain such financial intermediation, a regulatory intervention offering monopoly power to financial institutions, say in the form of exclusive territorial rights for banks, may be necessary.
